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56-0106

9 January 1956

**Memorandum of Conversation, 5 January 1956****Participants: Mr. Allen Dulles, Mr. Sherman Adams and  
Colonel Goodpasture**

This discussion was held at the request of Mr. Dulles to obtain the advice of Mr. Adams on the problem of the new CIA headquarters building. Mr. Dulles described the current status of the problem, including the recent adverse recommendation by the National Capital Planning Commission. In this connection, he wished to check the advice of Mr. Adams and Colonel Goodpasture as to the firmness of the President's previously expressed view that CIA should not locate in the District of Columbia.

Both Mr. Adams and Colonel Goodpasture stated that they felt the President would adhere to his original view that CIA should locate outside of the District. Mr. Adams did not seem particularly disturbed by the fact that the National Capital Planning Commission had recommended against the Langley site by a close vote, or by the fact that certain newspapers and groups of individuals were carrying on a vigorous campaign to insure that CIA did not locate in Langley.

It was agreed that the problem of the CIA building and other CIA problems should be discussed with the President upon his return to Washington. Mr. Dulles indicated that he also felt that Congressional leaders should be consulted before any final decision of the location of the building is made.

IG:NSP:fm

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NORMAN S. PAUL  
Legislative Counsel**Distribution:**

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14 October 1955

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: CIA/GSA Relationship - Proposed New Headquarters Building.

1. On 14 October 1955 Mr. Percival F. Brundage, Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget, and Mr. Edmund F. Mansure, Administrator of General Services, lunched with Mr. Dulles and me to discuss the GSA/CIA relationship in connection with the construction of our proposed new headquarters building. Mr. Dulles opened the discussion by expressing his hope that something mutually satisfactory to the General Services Administration and the Central Intelligence Agency could be worked out; Mr. Mansure said that he hoped so too. Mr. Brundage initially announced that GSA was in business to do this sort of thing on behalf of the Government and that he thought the burden of proof was on CIA as to why they should not handle this matter. Mr. Dulles said that he did not propose to make a case just for the sake of making a case, but that he did not see how he could in good conscience, or legally, surrender or delegate to the General Services Administration the responsibility placed upon him by Congress. He also went into some discussion as to the special requirements of our building, which in his mind would take it out of the "general purpose office building" category. In addition to the GSA legal position, which is that they clearly have this responsibility and that they cannot delegate to anyone else, Mr. Mansure, speaking most confidentially and frankly, pursued about the same line that he did in discussing this matter with Mr. Dulles, Mr. Harrison, and others when we all met a couple of months ago. Specifically, he said that he was under terrific pressure from both the Republican National Committee and the Government Operations Committee to take charge of construction such as ours and that while his selection of an architect would not be a political choice it certainly would be a firm which the National Republican Committee approved of. Mr. Dulles emphasized that he would not have politics play any part in our building anymore than he would any other matter pertaining to CIA, and that if necessary he would go to the President to defend his position.

2. While the entire meeting was very friendly, it was clear that there was no possibility of compromise. Mr. Mansure said that he didn't care whether or not GSA did the building, but that if they did not then he wanted to be taken off the hook both legally and politically. It was agreed that the next step should be to refer this matter to the Attorney General for a legal opinion. Mr. Brundage suggested that the Bureau of the Budget send the file to the Attorney General and that the General


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Counsels from GSA, CIA, and the Bureau of the Budget sit down with a representative of the Attorney General's Office to give him the background in order to save time.

3. After Messrs. Brundage and Mansure departed, I spoke with Mr. Dulles briefly and he asked if I thought Larry Houston would object if he asked Lofty Becker to come in and assist us on this particular case. I told him I did not think that Larry's feelings would be hurt but that I would speak to Larry about it and ask him to get in touch with Mr. Dulles as soon as possible. Mr. Dulles' idea is that this will be a real fight and that Lofty could be tougher than Larry without fear of jeopardizing the Agency's relationship on other matters. I have spoken to Larry about this and have asked him to get in touch with Mr. Dulles.

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L. K. WHITE  
Deputy Director  
(Support)

P. S. Toward the close of our luncheon Mr. Dulles expressed the hope that this matter could be resolved quickly and that the time actually lost in settling this point could be kept to an absolute minimum. Mr. Mansure said that he did not believe that this question should cause any loss of time and that he saw no reason whatever why we should not go ahead with the final site selection in the exact manner in which we were proceeding. He also said that it had been completely agreed by all concerned that Harrison & Abramovitz would be "one of the architects" on this project and that regardless of how the controversy between GSA and CIA came out there was no intention whatever of making any change in this agreement.

  
L.K.W.

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